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Abstract 
Social and socioeconomic interactions and transactions often require trust. In digital 
spaces, the main approach to facilitating trust has effectively been to try to reduce or 
even remove the need for it through the implementation of reputation systems. 
These generate metrics based on digital data such as ratings and reviews submitted 
by users, interaction histories, and so on, that are intended to label individuals as 
more or less reliable or trustworthy in a particular interaction context. We undertake 
a disclosive archaeology (Introna, 2014) of typical reputation systems, identifying 
relevant figuration agencies including affordances and prohibitions, (cyborg) 
identities, (cyborg) practices and discourses, in order to examine their ethico-political 
agency. We suggest that conventional approaches to the design of such systems are 
rooted in a capitalist, competitive paradigm, relying on methodological individualism, 
and that the reputation technologies themselves thus embody and enact this 
paradigm within whatever space they operate. We question whether the politics, 
ethics and philosophy that contribute to this paradigm align with those of some of the 
contexts in which reputation systems are now being used, and suggest that 
alternative approaches to the establishment of trust and reputation in digital spaces 
need to be considered for alternative contexts. 
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Introduction 
Sociomaterial accounts of human-technology interactions raise important questions 
about the degree to which technological systems and artefacts are imbued with 
agency (and hence morality) (Introna 2014). Whether one subscribes to inter-
actional (Johnson, 2006) or post-human intra-actional (Barad, 2003; Introna, 2014; 
Latour, 2002; 2003) accounts, the degree to which the design and features of 
technological systems alter and even co-create new social practices and identities, 
and how we can sensitize ourselves to such shapings, are important questions. In 
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this paper, we address the question of how reputation systems, as conventionally 
designed, co-constitute new versions of trust and identity in digital spaces. 
 
Trust is a fundamental component of social relations. It helps actors make decisions 
in situations where direct knowledge that can guide action and cooperation is not 
always immediately available. Trust helps reduce complexity in social interactions, 
allowing actors to take decisions in situations which entail some risk (Luhman, 1979). 
Interactions in a digital environment are likely to require trust (Hsu et al., 2007; Usoro 
et al., 2007) even more than those in a physical environment, as these interactions 
take place between people and organizations that may be geographically and 
culturally distant. While trust is often seen as a tri-partite relation between one 
individual (trustor) and another (trustee) in relation to an object or outcome, it can 
also take a collective form in what is known as reputation, or how a community or 
group of people view the trustworthiness of another person or entity.  
 
Increases in the availability of digital data are having a significant impact on our 
opportunities to engage in social interactions and the ways in which they are 
enacted. Increased digitization leads to increased remote and mediated interactions. 
If we view humanity as a network: before the internet, interactions tended to be 
between nodes that were previously only separated by a small distance; now the 
chances of creating a new connection/entering into a transaction or relationship with 
a previously very distant node are much higher, and the chances of the different 
parties to a social or economic transaction being physically co-located are much 
reduced (Shu and Chuang, 2011). 
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This has led to questions about how to establish trust in mediated interactions 
involving distant and/or unfamiliar actors, when: 
 
● We do not know whether the person with whom we are interacting/transacting 
is who they say they are. 
● We do not know whether they have the goods, skills or knowledge they claim 
to have. 
● We do not know whether their digital presence will persist, and so whether we 
will have any continued relationship (and therefore a chance to reciprocate or 
for comeback. 
● We cannot rely on local knowledge and word-of-mouth from people we know 
and already trust (reputation). 
 
Such concerns may be increasingly important in a period of concern about “fake 
news” and the manipulation of (social) media by various state and corporate actors. 
 
One of the main ways in which online platforms have responded to this situation is 
through reputation systems (Dellarocas, 2003; Jensen, Davis and Farnham, 2002; 
Resnick et al., 2000). These are systems that collate data in the form of feedback, 
ratings, and digital interaction/transaction histories, process them through algorithms, 
and produce a synthetic and very often quantitative measure intended to give a 
guide to an individual’s trustworthiness (Farmer and Glass, 2010). 
 
In a context/mission creep mirroring that of other business-intelligence inspired data 
analytics (Wilson et al., 2017), such systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous, 
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no longer confined to the trading and expert knowledge-sharing sites they were 
originally developed for. Described by Masum and Zhang as a ‘distributed court of 
opinion’ (2004, n.p.) that will alleviate the strain on our overburdened ‘individual 
processing capacity’ (ibid.) in the face of vastly increased accessible data and so 
‘help the same number of hours in the day go further’ (ibid.), great things are 
expected of them. It has been suggested they could play pivotal roles in the creation 
and maintenance of good governance, transparency and accountability in public 
office and commerce, through either the creation of trust or even – paradoxically – 
the removal of the need for it (Litos and Zindros, 2017; Masum, Tovey and 
Newmark, 2012; Masum and Zhang, 2004; Picci, 2007). But as they, or components 
such as ratings systems, permeate into perhaps unexpected digital spaces – such as 
learning environments1, community support groups (see, e.g., 
http://supportgroups.com) or even online communities of criminals needing to trust 
each other in the exchange of services and goods such as hacking and botnets 
(Décary-Hétu and Dupont, 2013; Dupont et al., 2016) – and as China moves to 
introduce a mandatory social credit system that incorporates elements of online 
reputation systems (Botsman, 2017) and that attempts to reduce individuals to single 
measures of quality – we need to ask questions about whether their design is 
commensurate with the intentions of the systems they are being brought into.  
 
One important question concerns the values that reputation systems embody and 
carry into the digital spaces in which they are used. It is now fairly widely accepted in 
certain areas of research that technology and technical artefacts (including 
information and communication technologies) are not politically or morally neutral. 
                                               
1 Virtual learning environments and learning management systems are increasingly making use of 
both the conceptual models and user-interfaces of business-intelligence applications, with examples 
such as the popular CANVAS system providing a 3-star scale to indicate student performance. 
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Winner (1980) argued that artefacts, very much like people, have their own politics 
which cause them to enact or contribute to particular types of ordered social system. 
He described the now well-known example of the low bridges on roads to Long 
Island from New York. Winner noticed that the low height of these bridges would 
exclude categories of people (those travelling on buses, generally working class 
people or African Americans) from certain actions, such as accessing a middle-class 
residential area. These low bridges thus embodied political decisions and enacted 
particular discriminations and exclusions.  
 
Going beyond politics that may be intentionally designed into technological artefacts, 
other authors have suggested that the neutrality thesis concerning the morality of 
technology and technical artefacts, including information and communication 
technologies, is untenable. For example, Van de Poel and Kroes (2014) argue 
persuasively that technical artefacts may embody what they refer to as moral 
extrinsic final values. By this they mean that the moral value or disvalue is 
associated with the artefact’s function and is therefore relational or extrinsic (since 
the function must relate to other objects, people or states of affairs) but is inherent to 
that function. The features and functionalities designed into digital technologies 
shape the affordances, opportunities and limitations for action that users experience, 
and thus pattern their potential behaviors, according to the values that the 
technologies embody. The Value Sensitive Design movement (Friedman et al., 2013; 
Johnson, 2006) has advocated designing artefacts and tools, including digital 
technologies, with an explicit awareness of the values they embody or promote. 
According to this community, ‘it is important that the values at stake are identified 
and analyzed carefully’ (Friedman et al., 2013; Kahn and Borning, 2013, 6) during 
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the design process. However, Introna (2014) suggests that technical artefacts not 
only embody values, but also have a kind of agency (through which morality can be 
ascribed to them) that goes beyond values that are (or may be) consciously 
designed into them. Introna’s position is grounded in a sociomaterial perspective 
(Barad, 2003; Latour, 2005) that recognizes technical artefacts as nexuses in 
complex networks of human and non-human, physical and digital actors that shape 
and are shaped by political and social currents flowing within and through them.  
 
In relation to reputation systems, an important question arises concerning the 
political and moral decisions that these systems embody and carry into the digital 
spaces they operate in. In the following, we draw on Introna’s (2014) call for a more 
disclosive approach to exploring the agency and ethics of sociomaterial systems. By 
conducting a ‘disclosive archaeology’ (Introna, 2014, p. 31) of typical reputation 
systems, we suggest that conventional reputation systems are loaded with not just 
the values they are designed for (trust, honest behavior, reliability), but also a more 
extended and subtle value-system: the political and ethical paradigm of the 
competitive, capitalist free market based on self-interested individuals. Such systems 
are underpinned by a view of reputation that implicitly (and sometimes even explicitly 
– see, for example, Gandini (2016)) commoditizes it, positioning it as a capital that is 
inherent to individuals, who can accumulate it, lose it and occasionally even 
speculate on it. This might be appropriate for a digital system that is intended to 
serve as a competitive market, for example an e-commerce website, or to function 
within a platform capitalist model. However, this may not be the case in other 
contexts, where a different political, ethical or philosophical paradigm underpins the 
construction or enactment of the digital space. 
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In the following, we start by describing the main features of conventional reputation 
systems. We identify some of the key ‘figuration agencies’ (Introna, 2014, p. 41) that 
invest these systems with the capacity to shape interactions and behavior patterns 
along certain ethico-political lines. We then examine various contexts in which such 
systems, or parts of them, operate, including trading sites and expert question-and-
answer (Q&A), and show why we believe they embody and enact a fundamentally 
market-based, capitalist paradigm. Finally, we examine other contexts in which they 
are used, including mutual cooperation platforms and supportive discussion forums, 
and ask whether the properties and features of these systems are likely to 
encourage the kinds of behaviors that participants and designers (and society at 
large) may wish for.  
 
 
Trust and reputation systems in digital spaces 
 
Common features of online reputation systems 
 
Online reputation systems are systems that draw on data about a user’s activities to 
generate an indication of that user’s standing within one or more online communities 
(Dellarocas, 2003; Jensen, Davis and Farnham, 2002; Resnick et al., 2000). In some 
ways similar to the points systems and leader-boards common to online games, in 
which points are sought competitively and assigned by the game; the “capital” nature 
of such points is made clear in those games that allow players to “spend” their points 
within the game-world.  
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Reputation systems outside of games have a stronger focus on providing users with 
a metric on which to base judgments about whether to trust other users or select 
them as partners for a transaction. They are now default parts of the design of e-
commerce sites, where items are bought and sold in conventional financial 
transactions. They are also integral to the increasing number of sites based on a 
“gig” (Friedman, 2014) or “sharing” (Hamari, Sjöklint and Ukkonen, 2015) economic 
model. In the former, members offer their skills and services for money but in a 
freelance capacity; in the latter, they provide or/and seek resources such as tools, 
transport or accommodation without the exchange of money. In addition, many 
expert Q&A sites (usually based on discussion forum rather than trading structures) 
employ reputation systems so that users asking questions can judge whether or not 
to trust an answer, or community members can build up their own reputation as 
experts (see, e.g., Movshovitz-Attias et al., 2013). For participants in these latter 
sites, high reputation scores may also be seen as badges of achievement or honour 
– measures of kudos, as indicated by the name of the reputation scores in the online 
expert coder community StackOverflow (Movshovitz-Attias et al., 2013; Bosu et al., 
2013). The inclusion of reputation systems in a digital space may thus also be seen 
as a form of gamification, providing motivation to contribute more and higher quality 
postings or items in a knowledge-sharing community. 
 
Reputation systems can base reputation measures on data from a range of sources, 
processed in a range of ways (Costagliola, Fuccella and Pascuccio, 2014; Hendrikx, 
Bubendorfer and Chard, 2015; Vavilis, Petković and Zannone, 2014). They may 
employ data generated directly from a user’s activities, such as how many times they 
visit a site, how long they spend on a site, how many transactions they complete, the 
 
Authors’ version of a paper accepted for publication in First Monday. Expected publication Feb 2019. 
 
10 
 
ratio of completed to started transactions, how many contributions they make to a 
discussion, how many network ties they have, and so on. They may also draw on 
ratings of that user’s contributions/behavior provided by other users: for example, 
through “likes,” up- and down-votes, ratings against particular reputation-items such 
as helpfulness, reliability, promptness etc., or qualitative feedback in the form of text-
based reviews. When reputation systems are intended to support transactions of a 
trading nature (whether as part of the conventional, gig or sharing economy), an 
entity’s reputation score might be based on customer feedback about reliability, 
product quality, speed of response, etc. When they are intended to support expert 
discussion forums or interest groups, reputation scores may be based on other 
users’ judgments of the quality of an individual’s contributions to the site, number of 
contributions, and so on. In either case, reputation metrics are intended to serve as 
proxies (Floridi, 2015) for prior experience and personal knowledge, on the basis of 
which predictions of future interactions can be made.  
 
Whichever factors are included in a reputation system, they are often used to 
generate a numerical measure of the user’s overall behavior/reputation/ranking 
within the relevant community (despite Masum and Zhang’s caution that ‘No person 
can be reduced to a single measure of “quality”’ (2004, np)). Reputation “scores” 
may be aggregates or averages; the data used to calculate these scores may be 
unweighted or weighted according to a range of factors, including the reputation of 
the user submitting the ratings and the age of the rating. Scores may be made public 
to other community members, so that they can make decisions about how and with 
whom they interact; or they may be known only to the site administrators (or an 
automated process) and used to make decisions about allowing or removing 
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privileges within, and even access to, services and users within the space. In the 
former case, they are visualized on the interface of the service (e.g., using star-
ratings or badges).  
 
 
Reputation systems as agentic components of sociotechnical/sociomaterial 
assemblages 
 
We believe that reputation systems cannot be considered as merely mechanical or 
technical artefacts that can be separated from the social environments in which they 
operate. Instead, we take a perspective that draws on the work of sociomaterial 
theorists such as Callon (1984), Latour (1987; 2003), Law (2009) and Delanda 
(2016). That is, we conceptualize platforms or sites that facilitate digital interactions 
as sociotechnical assemblages consisting of users, digital and physical infrastructure 
and resources, information and practices. Such a conceptualization includes two key 
elements: an emphasis on the possibility of emergent behaviors and effects such as 
‘ideas, identities, rules, routines …’ (Fenwick and Edwards 2010, 3); and a 
recognition that social or political agency is distributed within the assemblage, 
including artifacts, rather than inherent to individual human actors (Latour, 2005).  
 
A reputation system, in such a perspective, is an agentic component of the 
assemblage. It is, by design, intended to induce or discourage particular behaviors 
amongst the users of the systems and platforms they are part of. It explicitly acts to 
incentivize certain practices, from simply participating in the system to behaving in 
ways that are deemed “good,” and limit or exclude others. As such, a reputation 
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system is imbued with some kind of agency (even if it is viewed as derived). Indeed, 
a reputation system may be included in a platform precisely because of a recognition 
that ‘it takes effort to sustain stable networks of relations’ (Law and Singleton, 2005, 
337, emphasis in original) and reputation systems can be relied upon to constantly 
contribute to this effort. 
 
Introna suggests that, since they allow and prohibit particular practices in support of 
particular sets of values, technologies are ‘morally significant from that start’ (2014, 
p. 32). However, it is also likely that such agentic components of sociotechnical 
assemblages produce unintended consequences, for example emerging patterns of 
behavior or social or emotional experiences among users, which are instead effects 
of the assemblage as a whole. This, then, raises questions about where to locate 
moral agency within an assemblage. While the sociomaterial, intra-actional view 
sees agency as distributed, it may also be somewhat localised in particular 
components or clusters of components within an assemblage, in the form of what 
Latour refers to as mediators; that is, actors that ‘make others do unexpected things’ 
(Latour, 2005, p. 106). Thus, we might particularly associate certain agentic effects 
with reputation systems, since perhaps without their inclusion in the assemblage 
these effects would not emerge or be brought into being. However, this complex co-
constitution of the politics and ethics of technology may mean sociotechnical 
assemblages are ‘not open to simple intervention and correction’ (Introna, 2014, p. 
32) through regulation of use or minor change to design, but instead need to be 
constructed anew.  
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A disclosive archaeology of reputation systems 
 
Introna (2014) suggests that a disclosive archaeology aimed at exploring the ethico-
political agency of sociotechnical systems can usefully start with the delineation of 
the system’s ‘figuration agencies’ (Introna, 2014, p. 41). He proposes four 
categories:  
 
1. Affordances and prohibitions. 
2. (Cyborg) Identities. 
3. (Cyborg) Practices. 
4. Discourses. 
 
Here we adopt Introna’s use of the parenthetical adjective (cyborg) to indicate that, in 
the assemblage, identities and practices are ‘hybrid[s] of machine and organism 
(Haraway, 2006, p. 117), rather than inherently human.  
 
The outline of common reputation system features described above brings to light 
many of their affordances and prohibitions. Users can buy, sell, award stars, write 
feedback, favorite, up- and down-vote and so on – that is, they can pass public 
judgments of others. However, frequently, they cannot defend themselves – they 
cannot explain why they had to, or chose to, do things the way they did. They can 
also both accumulate and lose reputation, often spend it and sometimes even 
speculate on it. 
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To better understand affordances and prohibitions, and to uncover how reputation 
systems act within platform assemblages to co-constitute both (cyborg) identities and 
practices, we examine the operation of reputation systems in two contexts: 
trading/transactional states and expert Q&A forums. In doing so, we start to 
understand what kind of ethical and political paradigms reputation systems are likely 
to embody and enact. 
 
 
Reputation systems in trading/transactional sites 
 
There is a substantial existing body of research into the features and impact of 
reputation systems in platforms intended to support online commerce. For example, 
there have been several studies of the auction/market platform eBay’s reputation 
system and the impact it has on participation in the system (see, for example, Cabral 
and Hortaçsu, 2010; Dellarocas, Fan and Wood, 2004; Houser and Wooders, 2006; 
Hui et al., 2014; Resnick et al., 2000; Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Resnick, 
Zeckhauser and Swanson, 2006). The main findings of this research suggest that 
feedback contributions on eBay are not strongly driven by altruism (Dellarocas, Fan 
and Wood, 2004), and instead are more strongly driven by an expectation of 
reciprocity, in what is clearly an example of a (cyborg) practice that has emerged 
through the facilitation of the reputation system. In further examples of (cyborg) 
practices, Resnick et al. (2000) suggest that users not only reciprocate but also 
retaliate. They also suggest that users of the site become less likely to participate in 
the feedback process once they have accumulated experience (and “respectable” 
reputation scores). This observation is consistent with the suggestion that users’ 
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participation in the feedback process is not strongly driven by altruism, as it may 
imply that once users have built up a secure reputation, they no longer feel the need 
to elicit ratings from others by providing ratings themselves. Resnick, Zeckhauser 
and Swanson (2006) showed that reputation is, however, important, and that the 
same items, sold by the same seller under two different identities, attracted an 8% 
lower price when sold through a newly-established identity with low reputation, as 
compared to the seller’s “real” (well-established, high reputation) identity. These 
findings show that reputation systems have an important role in the construction of 
the (cyborg) identities of successful and unsuccessful, and hence “good” and “bad,” 
sellers. 
 
Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010) studied the impact of negative feedback, finding that the 
first time a seller receives negative ratings/feedback has a more significant impact on 
his/her sales than subsequent negative ratings, but also that once a seller receives a 
negative rating, they are much more likely to receive more. They also found that 
sellers with low reputations are more likely to exit the system. Thus the association 
of users with particular (cyborg) identities – in this case, the ‘bad’ seller – can result 
in a kind of emergent amplification or downward spiral. 
 
Reputation systems have also become fundamental components of platforms 
facilitating the gig economy, in which gig-workers offer services in a freelance 
capacity. AirTasker (http://airtasker.com), for example, has a reputation system that 
may be particularly important when users are seeking workers (called Taskers) who 
may carry out tasks in their homes, such as repairs, cleaning, or babysitting. 
AirTasker’s reputation system is, from the user’s point of view, almost identical to the 
 
Authors’ version of a paper accepted for publication in First Monday. Expected publication Feb 2019. 
 
16 
 
ones they will be familiar with on eBay etc. (we don’t know if the algorithm is exactly 
the same). Reputation scores are displayed using a five-star scale, calculated based 
on sub-scales provided through an exit survey and accompanied by free text 
comments. These efforts to establish trustworthiness are supplemented by steps 
taken to verify identity (steps which are as likely to give the platform itself more 
trustworthiness as individual Taskers).  
 
The effect of the sociotechnical assemblage is to clearly position human labor as a 
marketable commodity: as Taskers have to bid for jobs, having a high reputation 
score will increase their market access capacity and potential economic value. 
However, the reputation system seems to co-create a (cyborg) practice of almost 
universally positive feedback: every AirTasker is reviewed as wonderful (or not 
reviewed at all). This may reflect constraint on the part of those giving feedback, 
whether out of politeness or for some other motive, or the possible removal from the 
assemblage of Taskers who do not maintain a five-star average (as happens on 
many other gig-type platforms such as the transport-arranging site Lyft.com). 
 
AirTasker is a relatively demure gig-worker platform, positioning itself as a place 
where you can find a reliable cleaner or baby-sitter. Taking the example of Fiverr 
(http://fiverr.com), we see again a reputation system that is based on the same 
features as those operating in platforms on which goods are traded. However, 
Fiverr’s reputation system is made more complicated by the use of a “perks” system. 
This means that reputation buys not only higher levels of potential trust among 
users, but also actual increases in services provided by the platform. One possible 
result of this is that users with low reputations – likely to be those who have only 
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recently joined the site, or those who do not use it very often – are penalized, while 
those who have stayed “loyal” to the site and sell many of their services through it 
get preferential treatment. This is reminiscent of the use of points in online games, 
which incentivize continued play by linking points to the ability to unlock additional 
game features. Thus Fiverr’s reputation system not only contributes to the 
positioning of human labor as a commodity, but also simultaneously positions 
workers as game-players. 
 
The tone of text from both sellers and customers on Fiverr also points to some 
important consequences of treating human time, labor and reputation entirely as 
commodities. Fiverr gig-workers offer to do almost anything (recent offers include “I 
will sing Happy Birthday dressed as Tin Foil Man in a thong”) and Fiverr customers 
leave rather unconstrained reviews compared to those on AirTasker. Thus it seems 
that in the sociotechnical assemblage of Fiverr, which positions itself as rather 
youthful and hip, the reputation system co-constitutes a (cyborg) practice of 
judgmentality, and encourages customers to treat service providers as commodities 
or goods that can not only be bought and sold, but also categorized in relation to 
quality. At the same time, providers’ (cyborg) identities emerge as available, flexible, 
there to be commanded, and cheap – to the point where dignity is a potential barrier 
to success. 
 
Reputation systems also afford practices that may subvert the original intentions or 
inscriptions of the designers, in order to allow different constructions of (cyborg) 
identities. Reputation systems, especially in e-commerce platforms, seek to 
discourage cheating and manipulation. However the very design of these systems 
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offers affordances for malicious users to tamper with their own reputation or those of 
others in order to obtain illegal or prohibited advantages. As reputation, in these 
services, is an asset that may facilitates custom and drives people to purchases, 
unscrupulous participants may find ways to artificially increase their reputation 
scores to increase custom, or to lure customers into potentially fraudulent 
transactions. Equally, participants may try to damage the reputation of others, 
leading to the loss of custom for the targeted user and possibly increase in custom 
for a rival. Reputation manipulation, afforded by the reputation system as part of a 
sociotechnical assemblage, can thus undermine the capacity of these systems to 
generate and sustain healthy trust relations. These manipulations and their effects 
may also be seen as resulting from the computer-mediated nature of these trust 
building systems, which operate by proxy for far away actors and organizations. 
Clearly, a manipulated reputation is also a process of (cyborg) identity-building. 
 
 
Reputation systems in expert Q&A sites 
 
We turn now to briefly explore reputation systems in expert Q&A sites, using the 
example of StackOverflow. StackOverflow is a Q&A site where programmers can 
ask and answer questions relating to technical issues; it has probably the best-
known and most elaborately-developed reputation system in a Q&A site (Bosu et al., 
2013; Hart and Sarma, 2014; Movshovitz-Attias et al., 2013). In StackOverflow’s 
reputation system, users can up-vote and down-vote questions and answers 
provided by others, actions that not only contribute to reputation-building but also 
move questions up and down in terms of the order of display, and so make them 
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more or less visible. Users gain and lose reputation in a variety of ways, including 
through the up- and down-voting of questions; there are many more ways to gain 
reputation than to lose it. The most significant way to lose reputation points 
involuntarily is if a post is flagged as offensive or spam; points can also be “spent” 
(transferred to another user) in a bounty system for those seeking quick and 
accurate answers to complex or esoteric questions. 
 
In StackOverflow, points are converted into privileges: for example once a user has 
15 points, they can vote up a question or answer; once they have, 20, they can talk 
in a chat; once they have 125, they can vote down questions or answers; and so on. 
At 1500 points users are allowed to add new tags to the site (questions are tagged 
as corresponding to particular topic areas, such as SQL or Java); at 2000, users can 
edit other users’ questions and answers. At 10000 points users gain moderation 
rights; at 25000, they have access to the site’s analytics. Thus there are incentives to 
build one’s reputation that go beyond the acquisition of reputation for its own sake, or 
in order to gain the trust of other users. 
 
However, this reputation system is still grounded in an individualistic, accumulative 
and competitive paradigm, which may have negative consequences for the diffusion 
of professional knowledge. For example, Movshovitz-Attias et al. (2013) found that 
while the majority of questions on the site were posted by novice users with low 
reputations, on average higher reputation users ask more questions than lower 
reputation users, simply because they contribute more often to the site. 
StackOverflow has also been found to (unintentionally) exclude or discourage female 
participants (Vasilescu et al., 2012), which has been partially attributed to the reward 
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system. Thus StackOverflow’s reputation system contributes to the emergence of 
(cyborg) practices around how quickly and how often users both ask questions and 
provide answers, in ways that may to some extent undermine its aims and ethos. 
 
 
Discourses 
 
Turning to the last of Introna’s four figuration agencies, we examine some of the 
current discourses around online reputation. 
 
The notion of online reputation has received substantial attention in recent years, 
with some authors suggesting that the increasing digitization of transactions and 
interactions is leading to a “reputation society” (Masum, Tovey and Zhang, 2012) 
and others proposing that reputation is in fact social capital in a “reputation 
economy” (Gandini, 2016).  
 
As evident from the descriptions above, online reputation systems have been 
developed for two general purposes: as tools to help users of web-based platforms 
make decisions about whom to trust; and as motivators for more and higher quality 
participation in certain web-based activities or communities (and correspondingly as 
disincentives for unwanted behaviors). Such systems are based on the premise that 
‘reputation becomes visible, tangible and, under certain conditions, even measurable 
… through algorithms and metrics that elaborate online reputation scores’ (Gandini, 
2016, p. 28).  
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Some authors suggest that this kind of measurement and sharing of reputation 
information could radically shift the balance of power in society, as ‘peer networks 
will confer legitimacy on people emerging from the grassroots’ (Newmark, 2012, p. 
ix). However, one might ask whether reputation systems as currently developed are 
more likely to reinforce self-interested individualism, since they are grounded in 
methodological individualism which sees social groups as aggregations of 
individuals, each aiming at self-satisficing egoistic behavior, under the often not 
explicit idea that this is done for the benefit of the whole group. As Adam Smith 
famously stated, ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest’ 
(Smith, 1838, p. 7). 
 
Some aspects of these discourses around the power of digital reputation appear to 
have been taken to extremes in the (nominally socialist) Chinese government’s 
recent experiments with and planned national roll-out of a combined social and 
personal-financial credit system (Botsman, 2017; Hvistendahl, 2017). In these, 
conventional measures of financial credit-worthiness are being combined with 
behavioral metrics including shopping habits, friendship networks and the sharing of 
‘positive energy’ (Botsman, 2017, n.p.) online to produce a single trustworthiness or 
social credit score.  
 
Representing an alternative, more critical discourse, one episode of the TV series 
Black Mirror, Nosedive2, takes the idea of ubiquitous reputation systems to the 
extreme; in so doing, it powerfully illustrates some of the political implications of 
                                               
2https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/10/black-mirror-nosedive-review-season-
three-netflix/504668/ 
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reputation systems and their capacity to be the driver of social exclusion and 
inclusion. In it, people use an app on their mobile phone to rate each other during or 
after any real interaction. In a plot move that has echoes of the developing Chinese 
social credit system (Botsman, 2017; Hvistendahl, 2017), those with high scores 
have access to better apartments and other perks. On the other hand, those with low 
scores become social outcasts. This reputation system, then, constitutes an 
instrument for both upward and downward social mobility. Similarly to the low 
bridges described by Winner, the reputation system in Nosedive embodies a politics 
with rules of exclusion and inclusion which are enacted through and by the artefact. 
 
 
Disclosing the ethico-political agency of reputation systems: trust and reputation as 
forms of capital 
 
The characteristics of conventional reputation systems made apparent above are 
summarized in Table 1.  
 
Figuration agencies Some examples 
Affordances/prohibitions ● Acquisition/loss of reputation - reputation ‘wealth’ 
and ‘poverty’ 
● Rating people, as well as goods and services, for 
‘quality’ - awarding stars, writing feedback, 
passing judgment 
● Encourages behaviors for which points are 
 
Authors’ version of a paper accepted for publication in First Monday. Expected publication Feb 2019. 
 
23 
 
awarded, such as promptness, low price, 
reliability; discourages behaviors that deviate 
from the norm. 
● Often removes the possibility of explanation for 
poor reputation (scores)  
● Removes need for criticality and complex 
judgments 
● Self-fulfilling/self-reinforcing (upward and 
downward spirals) 
 
 
(Cyborg) Identities Constructs identities of “good” platform users, e.g.  
● seller - popular, many interactions 
● gig-economy worker - flexible available, cheap 
● buyer - gives feedback on every interaction 
● expert - quickest to answer, frequent contributor 
● Novice - should keep quiet and not venture 
opinions until reputation has grown. 
 
(Cyborg) Practices ● Immediate feedback 
● Constrained feedback - in response to pre-
determined categories, and a reluctance to write 
negative reviews (every transaction is 
marvellous) 
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● Unconstrained feedback - under the cover of 
anonymity, fake ids and distance 
● Reciprocation, retaliation, collusion 
● Competition and attacks 
● Dominance and lurking (peripheral participation) 
● Creation of notion that it is normal and indeed 
expected to rate people,  as well as goods and 
services or the perceived quality of their 
knowledge 
● Creation of reliance on the opinions of others 
rather than the exercise of judgment or the 
explicit taking of risks 
 
Discourses ● Commoditization of reputation 
● Reputation as (social) capital 
● Interaction partners as vendors and customers 
 
Table 1: Figuration agencies of reputation systems 
 
By disclosing these figuration agencies, we begin to understand what sort of politics 
may be embodied in conventional reputation system designs, and to see how this is 
re-inscribed back into online communities. These systems appear to be based on 
individualism, the free market as the ideal (political) economy and liberalism as the 
essence of social relations. For example, Dellarocas, one of the most influential 
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theorists of these type of systems, states that ‘[t]he new platforms may be all about 
harnessing crowds and communities, but in the end, those crowds and communities 
are nothing but a sum of individuals’ (2010, p. 33), a position that neglects the 
sometimes strong and complex social, political and cultural mechanisms that couple 
individuals and result in emergent, collective behavior. Similarly, Picci explicitly 
positions his arguments as rooted in rational choice theory, positing that ‘individual 
social actors act to advance their self-interest’ (2007, n.p.) and claiming that 
reputation systems ‘allow selection forces to weed out the least fit’ (ibid.). Gandini’s 
claim that reputation is social capital rests on the belief that it is ‘an eminently 
economic concept’ (2016, p. 30) that ‘functions as a form of currency enabling trust 
among strangers’ (ibid., p. 32) and that is ‘a resource that may be mobilized and that 
remains with the individual … as a capital that is invested, traded or managed … as 
an investment in social relations with expected economic return’ (ibid., p. 36), a view 
that combines individualism with a clear commoditization of reputation. 
 
However, if reputation is viewed as a currency or marketable commodity, resulting 
from action of self-interested individuals, then it may be exposed to the same risks 
and problems that arise in financial markets, including questions related to 
ownership, fairness and control. Indeed, the global financial crisis has led to renewed 
questions as to the validity of competitive, free-market models and suggestions that 
approaches that recognize the strong coupling of different components in the system 
should be developed (Helbing and Kirman, 2013). Within the economics of 
reputation and trust that reputation systems are helping to create, there is already 
evidence for the kind of problems that arise when financial gain can be made by 
adopting certain behaviors, including the use of multiple or fake personas to acquire 
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undeserved reputational credit/value, exaggerated reciprocity, individualized 
reciprocity resulting in clique formation, retaliation and clique-based attacks. As early 
as 2007, an ENISA report (Carrara and Hogben, 2007), listed fifteen potential threats 
to the generation of trust through reputation systems, including among others the 
Sybil attack, whitewashing, ballot stuffing and collusion. For example in the collusion 
threat/attack, several malicious users collude together to boost the potential 
reputation associated with one (or more) account. As this reputation then is inflated 
by fabricated positive ratings given by colluders, it could be used to lure customers 
attracted by the high reputation of a seller, only to defraud them subsequently.  
 
Collusion is per se a process which is afforded by the design of rating systems, 
where multiple unknown people’s ratings contribute to build a reputation score. We 
often hear in the news about another potential threat, namely extortion and/or bad-
mouthing. This is the case when there are single individuals, or more organized 
campaigns (which would amount again to collusion), which operate for the purpose 
of blackmailing or producing unfairly negative ratings for a user which could easily 
lead to a loss of reputation or loss of custom. Moreover, this could also lead to 
difficulties for the target user for regaining the original reputation. This is known to be 
an issue in websites such as Tripadvisor3 or other leisure review websites, where the 
service has a procedure in place for e.g. hotel owner to report that. It is also known 
that there are crowdsourcing services which offer unscrupulous sellers ways to boost 
their reputation (Xu et al., 2015) or damage the reputation of others. Bots have also 
been linked with manipulation of reputation and to an automated production of 
scores, which are not reflective of actual behavior and thus (cyborg) identity of 
                                               
3 See https://www.tripadvisor.com/TripAdvisorInsights/w592 
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participants (De Paoli, 2013). Reputation systems, then, may not only enact a 
market-based, accumulative and acquisitive capitalist paradigm in whatever digital 
spaces they are employed – but also risk introducing behaviors that are detrimental 
to the health and sustainability of those spaces.  
 
 
Implications for platforms intended to foster non-competitive, non-
individualistic interactions and behaviors 
 
While a market-based view of reputation may be acceptable and even desirable in a 
business-focused trading site, it may undermine the intentions and purported values 
of other types of site. For example, although expert Q&A sites could be viewed as 
markets for knowledge, with competition among providers to supply the best quality 
knowledge, they are not real markets in the sense that there is no obvious cost to 
those seeking (and presumably consuming) the knowledge on offer and knowledge-
providers retain the knowledge that they give out. Instead, a closer comparison might 
be with school or university learning environments, or sites of professional learning, 
where knowledge, once created, can be distributed and shared at no loss to any 
party to the sharing transaction. Rather than the power dynamics of a market, 
governed by competition and differentiation in wealth, expert Q&A sites are more 
likely to be characterized by dynamics of pride and commitment to the advancement 
and promotion of particular forms of knowledge and skill. In this kind of context, 
reputation might still take the form of something to be accumulated, but not so much 
at the expense of other actors competing for the same resources and capital.  
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Some of the implications for the inclusion of reputation systems in sociotechnical 
assemblages not intended to facilitate commercial transactions or operate on a 
platform capitalist basis can already be seen in existing platforms. As stated above, 
reputation systems are increasingly being included in platforms that have quite 
different intended functions. Systems based on the same principles are also 
increasingly being incorporated into digital spaces that indeed set out to bypass 
commercial transactions and achieve cooperative or mutualistic transactions. For 
example, the accommodation-arranging platform Couchsurfing.com positions itself 
as setting out to achieve a social good: ‘We envision a world made better by travel 
and travel made richer by connection. Couchsurfers share their lives with the people 
they encounter, fostering cultural exchange and mutual respect’ (Couchsurfing, 
2016). Couchsurfing.com relies on substantial levels of trust between strangers, as 
users share their homes with each other without any monetary exchange.  
 
Lauterbach (2009) showed that there are significant levels of both direct and 
generalized reciprocity within the overall couchsurfing community. Couchsurfing’s 
reputation system is based on systems used in conventional economic trading sites 
but has two unusual features. The first is in its use of friendship ties. Users can 
identify the type of relationship they have with other users, choosing from: Haven’t 
met yet, Acquaintance, CouchSurfing friend, Friend, Good friend, Close friend, and 
Best friend. Thus the reputation system contributes to the construction of distinct 
(cyborg) identities in which friendship is categorised and graded. Couchsurfers who 
have hosted or stayed with other members are permitted to submit private feedback 
(to Couchsurfing) and public references for 14 days after a stay. Members must have 
a couch request with the “Yes” “Maybe” or “Confirmed” status in order to leave a 
 
Authors’ version of a paper accepted for publication in First Monday. Expected publication Feb 2019. 
 
29 
 
Surf/Host reference. Other members may create references under the “Other” or 
“Friend” reference designations (as opposed to “Surf” or “Host”). Users’ publicly 
visible reputation information is simply the number of references they have been 
given, and the number of those that are positive and have been confirmed (i.e., the 
user has confirmed the host/guest exchange). Other users can see free text 
references left by former guests/hosts. All of these affordances and prohibitions 
contribute to the creation of possible (cyborg) practices.  
 
It seems that this qualification of feedback based on the nature of relationships may 
be an attempt to mitigate the pure free-market nature of a conventional ratings-
based system, in which every opinion counts the same, no matter how well-informed. 
However, this reputation system remains at heart accumulative and judgmental, and 
constructs the (cyborg) identity of ‘good host’ in ways very similar to the construction 
of ‘good seller’ on trading sites. Couchsurfing has a second unusual feature, which 
offers another example of how a reputation system can undermine the stated ethos 
of a platform. After some years of operating with the system described above, 
Couchsurfing.com introduced an additional “vouching” system, to allow some users 
to increase their reputation levels. This very restrictive system allows users to vouch 
for other users only if they have received three or more “vouches” themselves, 
effectively restricting vouching to an elite core: in, 2009, only 6.8% of members were 
able to vouch (Lauterbach et al., 2009). The affordances and prohibitions associated 
with vouching seem to have created both new (cyborg) practices (vouching and 
exaggerated reciprocation) and new (cyborg) identities (an elite). Thus the use of a 
conventional reputation system – albeit with some modifications – may in fact 
represent a misalignment with Couchsurfing’s stated values of opening up 
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sociocultural spaces and recognizing the contribution to this endeavor made by 
anyone who is willing to open up their home to a stranger. 
 
Another sociotechnical context in which conventional reputation systems may not 
align with designers and users intentions and values is the supportive discussion 
forum. On the surface, such forums may seem to be similar to the expert Q&A 
forums considered in the previous section – discussion boards to which users can 
post questions that they are seeking answers to from community members with 
similar interests, pre-occupations and lived experiences. However, there are some 
fundamental differences to the aims and use of such sites which may have profound 
implications for any kind of trust facilitation system. 
 
First, expert Q&A sites such as StackOverflow are professional/technical interest 
community sites. Their users tend to be people who already have some degree of 
technical expertise (and therefore knowledge and cultural capital) and are seeking 
more. Several things follow from this: 
 
 Questions on sites such as StackOverflow are technical in nature, seeking 
specific solutions to specific coding, implementation or operating system 
problems. 
 They are likely to have answers which can be clearly judged as right, wrong or 
useful, depending on whether these answers lead to solutions that the 
questioner (and other members of the community) can implement. Where 
there may be more than one correct answer/workable solution, some will be 
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more efficient or simpler to implement than others, and can be judged better 
on those grounds. 
 Because users have some existing level of expertise, their judgment as to the 
value of answers might be expected to be reasonably reliable. 
 Users are often enthusiasts for their work, and so are discussing something 
they enjoy doing. They are also proud of their expertise and are keen to 
provide answers if they have them. 
 Questions (and answers) on sites such as StackOverflow are almost never 
personal or emotional; they are rarely likely to be of dramatic importance to 
the questioner’s life or living conditions. 
 
In contrast, the stories that may be told, and the advice and guidance sought and 
given on community support discussion forums, for example relating to health issues 
or financial problems, may relate to issues which are of substantial personal 
significance to users. There are many such communities, some facilitated by 
charities, health systems, or other authoritative figures or structures, but others 
having a more grass roots or community-driven character (see, for example, Barak, 
Boniel-Nissim and Suler, 2008; Chung, 2013). Many are associated with particular 
illnesses, whether physical or mental (see, for example, Eysenbach et al., 2004; 
Griffiths et al., 2009; Wright and Bell, 2003). Some discussion forums and mailing 
lists have developed to provide a safe space for minority groups such as the LGBTQI 
community (Mehra, Merkel and Bishop, 2004). Others provide discussion forums for 
larger groups, a good example being the parenting forum Mumsnet (Pedersen and 
Smithson, 2013).  
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While reputation scores are not yet widespread among such sites, they have found 
their way into some of them. For example, the set of discussion forums hosted by the 
platform supportgroups.com, which includes forums dedicated to financial problems, 
homelessness, anxiety, and other mental and physical health issues, has a linked 
reputation system so that users can acquire points for contributing across the forums 
they are enrolled in. The use of reputation systems in digital spaces that might attract 
vulnerable, socially-isolated or excluded people may be of particular concern. There 
is a well-established correlation between ill-health or social exclusion and 
depression/anxiety (see, for example, Belle Doucet, 2003; Galea et al., 2007; Murali 
and Oyebode, 2004; Murphy and Athanasou, 1999; Paul and Moser, 2009; Vinokur, 
Price and Kaplan, 1996), which is not surprising given the potential for experiences 
of precariousness, social exclusion and social isolation, and feelings of inadequacy 
and decreasing hope. While people may well have positive stories and strategies to 
share, they may often be describing how they overcame a difficulty that was quite an 
unpleasant experience. Similarly, those visiting the site in order to find help and 
advice may well be seeking the emotional, as well as practical, support that can be 
provided by a community of people experiencing similar difficulties. We might 
speculate on the potential impact of inscribing a capitalist-oriented reputation system 
into such an environment. While on the one hand users might value trust creation 
processes as they decide who to interact with and seek support from, it is easy to 
imagine situations in which reputation scores might have negative impacts, for 
example on users’ self-esteem. Given the value-system inherent in the design of 
conventional reputation systems, reputation may represent another form of capital in 
which users can find themselves to be poor, and so another benchmark of failure, 
inadequacy and inequity. 
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In all the above examples of existing systems, reputation is effectively reduced to a 
commodity – something that can be accumulated and lost, for which there exists a 
competitive market, and which is highly individualized. Given that the desired 
purposes of sociotechnical assemblages in which reputation systems act are 
extremely varied and may be intended to create and maintain a healthy knowledge 
ecosystem or provide a supportive community of peers, introducing such a 
capitalism of reputation may be counterproductive. Trust is likely to be important in 
facilitating and encouraging interactions on such community-focused, supportive 
platforms, and some kind of trust facilitation or reputation system may well be 
needed; however our disclosive archaeology of the ethico-political agency of 
conventional reputation systems suggest the need for a novel approach, which is not 
based on individualistic principles. From the evidence available from studies of 
mutual cooperation sites such as couchsurfing.com, it seems that, as Introna (2014) 
warns, attempts to regulate the impact of conventionally-designed reputation 
systems by making small alterations are insufficient. Rather, what is needed is an 
approach that reinforces relationality and community cooperation. We therefore 
suggest there is a real need to rethink online trust and reputation, starting from a 
rejection of individualism and the notion of reputation as a form of capital, and 
turning to systems that valorize cooperation and mutualistic acts that increase the 
quality and strength of the assemblage as a whole. 
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